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Poland's DSA implementation acts and the ministry's platform enforcement push

Last checked16 October 2026
KeeperOpen — keeper wanted
StatusSenate passed 14 Oct 2026 — not in force

The short version

Poland is implementing the Digital Services Act with two acts, not one. The first is already in the Dziennik Ustaw: it makes the President of UKE — the electronic communications regulator — Poland's Digital Services Coordinator, with control and sanctioning competences. The second, on reacting to illegal content, was adopted by the Sejm on 8 October 2026 and by the Senate with amendments on 14 October 2026, and had not been signed by the President when we last checked — an earlier DSA implementing act was vetoed in January 2026. At a meeting with platform representatives on 16 October 2026 the digital minister put numbers on his complaint: 89 items flagged as illegal by state institutions between 7 and 12 October, 30 removed; for X, 57 reported and 20 removed or restricted. He demanded real age verification and immediate deletion of accounts of children under 13. Nothing new is due from a small operator today.

Two acts, one of them already in force

Poland is not implementing the Digital Services Act with a single statute. The Ministry of Digitalisation prepared two, after the President vetoed an earlier DSA implementing act in January 2026; the replacement draft went to inter-ministerial and public consultation on 6 February 2026. Read them separately, because their stages are different and only one of them is law.

Act one — already in the Dziennik Ustaw
The first DSA implementing act is described by the ministry as already announced in the Journal of Laws. It aligns Polish law with the regulation and designates the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (UKE) as Poland's Digital Services Coordinator. The coordinator supervises how the DSA is applied, handles citizens' complaints, cooperates with the European Commission and with the competent authorities of the other member states, and runs proceedings against providers that break the rules. The act gives the UKE President control and sanctioning competences, and sets the rules for certifying out-of-court dispute settlement bodies, trusted flaggers and vetted researchers. Polish legal press reports it was signed at the end of September 2026; we have that headline only.
Other regulators sit inside the same act
The chair of KRRiT, the broadcasting council, supervises video-sharing platforms. The President of UOKiK, the competition and consumer authority, takes consumer protection — including unfair platform practices such as missing ad transparency and dark patterns. A National Council for Digital Services (Krajowa Rada ds. Usług Cyfrowych) is created as an advisory body to the UKE President, with members from academia, civil society, business and public institutions.
Act two — through the Sejm and the Senate, not signed
This is the act about reacting to illegal content: a national procedure for issuing orders that make illegal content inaccessible. The Sejm adopted it on 8 October 2026. The ministry says the Senate adopted it with amendments on 14 October 2026; at least one trade report dates the Senate vote to 13 October, and we could not settle the difference (see what we could not establish).
Where it stands
With the President. On 12 October 2026 the digital minister, Krzysztof Gawkowski, said he counts on the President signing the second act, and he repeated the expectation on 16 October. We have found no report of a signature and no promulgation date. The file has failed once already: the earlier implementing act was vetoed in January 2026.
"The Polish DSA act" is not one thing. The act already in the Journal of Laws is the supervision act — it answers "who enforces in Poland". The act still unsigned is the takedown act — it answers "how fast can content be blocked". If a supplier or a newsletter tells you "the Polish DSA act has entered into force", the only useful question is which of the two.

What the second act would do

Everything below comes from the ministry's own account of the text the Sejm passed and of the amendments the Senate added. We have not read the consolidated text. The article numbers in this section are article numbers of the Criminal Code (Kodeks karny, KK), which the act refers to — not articles of the new act itself.

Who issues an order
Orders to make illegal content inaccessible are issued by the President of UKE, the chair of KRRiT and the courts. An order can be challenged by an objection (sprzeciw) to an ordinary court, and the procedure is to involve all sides: the applicant, the platform and the user.
A court always decides for some offences
Where the content concerns totalitarian ideologies — nazism, communism, fascism — or incitement to hatred and insult on national, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, under Article 256 § 1–2 and Article 257 KK, the blocking order is always issued by a court.
What the Senate changed
One category moved. Orders for content tied to violence or unlawful threats on grounds of race, national or ethnic origin, religion, non-denominational status or political affiliation — Article 119 § 1 KK, which can cover threats and harassment in social media — are to be issued by the UKE President or the chair of KRRiT instead of by a court.
Immediate execution — and how the Senate widened it
Immediate execution, meaning executing a blocking decision before it is final, is the part that matters commercially. In the text the Sejm passed on 8 October it was confined to the most serious crimes against children (Article 200 § 3 and 5, 200a, 200b, and 202 KK). The Senate's amendment extended the catalogue in which a decision can be executed at once: violence or unlawful threats on the protected grounds above (Article 119 KK), accepting a contract killing (Article 148a), incitement or assistance in suicide (Article 151), and inducing or forcing a person to cause themselves serious harm to health (Article 156a). The deputy digital minister, Dariusz Standerski, calls it an exceptional solution limited to a strictly defined catalogue of offences.
On whose request
A prosecutor or the Police. That is how the ministry put it on 16 October: immediate execution of a blocking decision for content tied to the most serious offences, if the application comes from a prosecutor or the Police.
The list for the fast route
Prosecutors, the Police, the National Revenue Administration (KAS) and the Border Guard may apply for fast blocking where content meets the elements of the listed offences: Art. 119, 148a, 151, 156a, 189a (human trafficking), 190, 190a § 2, 191a § 1, 200 § 3 and 5, 200a, 200b, 202 § 1 and § 3–4c, 224a, 256 § 1–2 and 257 of the Criminal Code.
Two deadlines got shorter
The Senate also cut the time for submitting evidence in the most serious cases: the platform gets 24 hours instead of 14 days, and the author of the content gets 24 hours instead of 2 days.
The vacatio legis
Cut from six months to three months after promulgation. That is the clock anyone counting towards a compliance date has to work with — and it starts at promulgation, which has not happened.
The users' side
Separately from blocking, the act is to give people who disagree with a platform's decision to remove content or block an account new appeal procedures run by the UKE President and KRRiT.

The 7–12 October figures

The minister brought numbers to the meeting. Between 7 and 12 October 2026, state institutions flagged 89 materials as illegal under the Criminal Code; 30 of them were removed. For X, the figures he gave were 57 reported materials, 20 removed or with visibility restricted, and 37 with no action taken at all.

What the ministry's own release says
Less specific, and worth reading beside the numbers: analysing platform reactions to removal requests for illegal content that appeared during the recent knife attacks in schools, the ministry says more than two-thirds of NASK's reports were ignored at the time. The reasons are to be analysed at a further meeting with the platforms.
X was not in the room
Invitations went to Meta, Google, TikTok, Roblox, Discord, X, Snap and Telegram. The ministry says X, Snap and Telegram did not take part. The minister called X a "hate platform" (platforma hejterska) and said he would start the relevant procedures against it once the DSA provisions are in force. X's press office did not answer the Polish news agency's question, so nothing here is X's account of the same events.
These are the minister's numbers about state-institution reports in a five-day window. We have seen no published per-platform breakdown, and the ministry's own release does not carry the 89 and 30 figures — those come from the reporting, which attributes them to the minister. Treat them as a claim by one side of the meeting.

Age verification, under-13 accounts, a 15-year ambition

The demands on the age side came in the minister's own words, in the ministry's release (our translation):

"Real verification of the age of users, immediate removal of the accounts of children under 13"

"I demanded concrete action from the digital platforms: real verification of the age of users, immediate removal of the accounts of children under the age of 13 and effective moderation of content. Algorithms must not drive the dissemination of traumatic material that harms the mental health of the youngest. The platforms also committed to shortening their reaction time to reports from the Polish services and to improving cooperation with the Police. I expect measurable results, not declarations alone."

The under-13 line is not a new rule
What is demanded is speed: accounts of under-13s deleted immediately rather than, as the English summary of the briefing puts it, after weeks or months. That summary is our only source for the "weeks or months" wording.
A 15-year limit is the stated aim
The ministry says it aims to introduce a 15-year boundary for access to social media services. That is a declared policy aim in a press release, not a provision in either act, and no instrument to deliver it has been published.
"Real verification" — but no mechanism
Nothing in the texts we read describes how an age would be checked: no wallet, no certification, no standard, no named provider. Read it as the strong of the four words in our explainer — the expensive one — not as a specification.
No Polish age-verification mandate is in force. What exists is a demand made in a meeting, and an aim of a 15-year boundary. The live age-related duty for platforms reachable from Poland is the DSA's own: Article 28 requires online platforms accessible to minors to put in place appropriate and proportionate measures to ensure a high level of privacy, safety and security for minors — the provision described in the explainer. Nothing on this page adds a national age check to that.

The expedited channel with NASK and the CBZC

The meeting did produce commitments, and they are the practical half of it: the platforms agreed to immediate improvements in how they work with Polish state services in a crisis.

What was agreed
Faster direct contact channels for reporting content, and urgent training for the services' representatives on how content can be reported and on the ongoing contacts needed to run proceedings. The platforms committed to shorter reaction times to reports from the Polish services and to better cooperation with the Police.
The expedited procedure
Reports from NASK (the national research institute and contact point), the Central Cybercrime Bureau (CBZC) and other state institutions are to be handled through a shortened procedure, rather than in the ordinary queue.
The follow-up
The minister says he expects measurable results and that the ministry will say publicly which platform is responsive. A further meeting is to analyse why the platforms reacted as they did to the reports. The ministry is also working with the Ministry of Justice on making it easier for law enforcement to obtain information from platforms, for crime and for financial fraud.
The part the platforms did not commit to
The ministry says some platforms could not give an unambiguous declaration that their own moderation teams would decide, on their own initiative, to remove content threatening safety — they expect a legal regulation imposing such a mechanism. That is a platform argument for the unsigned act, and it cuts against the reading that the act is only about state censorship.

What a small provider or forum would face

Today: nothing new. The DSA applies on its own terms, and the first Polish act is about who supervises it in Poland — including a complaint route to the coordinator that did not previously have a Polish address. This is written for someone whose forum, community or app is reachable from Poland, not only for the eight invited platforms.

If the second act is signed
Poland gains a national blocking route: orders from the UKE President, the KRRiT chair or a court; immediate execution for the listed offences when a prosecutor or the Police ask; and a court challenge by objection. A service that hosts content can be the addressee of such an order, and the deadline to submit evidence to defend the content is 24 hours.
What actually changes on your side
Two things, and neither is an age check. First, a user appeal route: if you remove a post or block an account, a Polish user can now take that to the UKE President or KRRiT — so record the reason for the decision when you make it. Second, an enforcement address: the coordinator has a name, and the act gives it control and sanctioning competences.
Do not buy age verification on this news
The age demands are addressed to the platforms and are, in the ministry's own framing, expectations plus a policy aim. A date-of-birth field is attestation and costs a form; verification costs a vendor and a data-protection assessment. The four words are separated in the explainer.
The deadlines to watch
Signature, then promulgation, then three months of vacatio legis. The minister wants the signature now; the previous act in this file was vetoed in January 2026, so the timetable can still fail.

A Senate vote is not a signature

The second act was adopted by the Senate with amendments on 14 October 2026 and, on what we could read, was still waiting for the President on 16 October. Until it is promulgated and the three-month vacatio legis has run, there is no Polish blocking order for anyone to receive and no Polish entry-into-force date to put in a calendar. Re-read this note after the signature.

What we could not establish

The text, as the Senate left it
Not read. Everything in that section is the ministry's account of the Sejm's version and of the Senate's amendments, taken separately. The act's own article numbers, its title in the Dziennik Ustaw and its printed number are all unknown to us.
The fines
The minister is reported as saying the provisions carry high penalties for non-compliance, and one English summary renders that as "multimillion fines". The ministry's own texts give no amount and no basis: what they say is that the first act gives the UKE President control and sanctioning competences. For scale only — and this is not a Polish figure — the DSA's own ceiling for fines on providers is 6% of total worldwide annual turnover (Article 74(1)), the figure our age-verification explainer carries. We did not re-read the regulation for this page.
The signature and the entry-into-force date
No report of a presidential signature, no promulgation date. Because the vacatio legis runs from promulgation, no entry-into-force date can be given, and anyone quoting one is guessing.
Whether the Senate voted on 13 or 14 October
The ministry's own release says 14 October 2026; at least one Polish trade report says the Senate adopted the act on 13 October. We read the ministry's release in full and the trade report only as a search result, so the page uses the ministry's date and records the discrepancy here.
The per-platform figures
The 89 and 30, and X's 57, 20 and 37, come from the reporting of the minister's briefing. The ministry's release says instead that more than two-thirds of NASK's reports were ignored. No published breakdown, no per-platform table.
Whether a small provider is exempt from any of it
Nothing in the ministry's account of either act mentions a size threshold or an exemption for micro and small enterprises. An absence of mention is not the absence of an exemption, and this note does not read it as one. The DSA's own size carve-outs are described in the explainer.

Sources

Two of the four sources below are the Polish ministry's own releases, both read in full in the Polish original; one is the ministry's background page. The reporting is cited for the figures the ministry does not publish. Where a claim rests on a search result and not on a page we could open, it says so above and here.

  1. Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji — Ochrona dzieci tematem rozmów z platformami cyfrowymi (Polish) Ministry of Digitalisation, 16 October 2026. The backbone of this page. Source for the meeting of that day and its subject, the invitation list (Meta, Google, TikTok, Roblox, Discord, X, Snap, Telegram) and the three that did not attend, the ministry's aim of a 15-year boundary for social media services, the NASK 2022 research figures, the analysis of platform reactions during the school knife attacks with more than two-thirds of NASK reports ignored, the agreed faster contact channels and urgent training, the platforms' commitment on reaction times and Police cooperation, the platforms that could not declare they would remove safety-threatening content on their own initiative, the minister's quotations on real age verification and immediate deletion of under-13 accounts, the statement that the first DSA implementing act is announced in the Dziennik Ustaw with the President of UKE as Digital Services Coordinator, the Senate's adoption of the second act on 14 October 2026 with amendments and the immediate execution of blocking decisions on a prosecutor's or Police request, and the joint work with the Ministry of Justice. Read in full for this page
  2. Ministerstwo Cyfryzacji — Sprawniejsze reagowanie na przestępstwa w internecie. Senat przyjął ustawę o DSA (Polish) 14 October 2026. Source for the Senate's amendments in detail: the shift of Article 119 § 1 KK orders from courts to the UKE President or the chair of KRRiT, the extension of the immediate-execution catalogue (Art. 148a, 151, 156a KK), the shortened evidence deadlines (24 hours instead of 14 days for platforms, 24 hours instead of 2 days for the author), the vacatio legis cut from six to three months, the January 2026 veto and the 6 February 2026 consultation, and the description of the act already in the Journal of Laws. Read in full for this page
  3. Portal Gov.pl (Baza wiedzy) — DSA, co zmienią nowe przepisy (Polish) Government background page, 12 October 2026. Source for the Sejm's adoption of the second act on 8 October 2026, the issuing authorities (UKE President, chair of KRRiT, courts), the objection route to an ordinary court and the participation of applicant, platform and user, the full list of Criminal Code offences behind the fast-blocking route, the Sejm-stage limitation of immediate enforceability to crimes against children, the court-only rule for Art. 256 and 257 KK, the new appeal procedures for users through UKE and KRRiT, and the KRRiT, UOKiK and National Council for Digital Services roles. Read in full for this page
  4. RMF24 (PAP) — Gawkowski o „hejterskiej platformie" i ustaleniach ws. ochrony dzieci (Polish) Broadcaster report, 16 October 2026. Source for the 89 materials flagged between 7 and 12 October and the 30 removed, for X's 57 reported materials with 20 removed or restricted and 37 untouched, for the "hate platform" description and the announcement of procedures once the DSA provisions apply, and for the fact that X's press office did not answer PAP. Read in full for this page
  5. UA.NEWS — Gawkowski demands stronger child protection from platforms — Interia English summary of an Interia report, 16 October 2026. Cited for the wording "multimillion fines" and for the "after weeks or months" phrasing of the under-13 timing, both of which we attribute to it and neither of which appears in the ministry's own texts. The Interia article it summarises is listed below. Read in full for this page
  6. Interia — Platformy cyfrowe. Krzysztof Gawkowski żąda usuwania kont dzieci (Polish) 16 October 2026. The original report behind the English summary above. The page body did not render for us — we saw the headline and opening only, which is why nothing on this page rests on it alone.
  7. NowyMarketing — Nowe zasady blokowania treści i kont w Polsce. Senat przyjął ustawę wdrażającą DSA (Polish) Trade report, October 2026. Search-result snippet only. Cited in what we could not establish for the one claim that the Senate adopted the act on 13 October 2026, one day earlier than the ministry's release says. We could not open the page, so the date is recorded as a discrepancy and not used in the text above.
  8. Prawo.pl — Blokowanie treści w internecie, co zakłada ustawa wdrażająca DSA (Polish) Legal trade publisher, October 2026. Search-result snippet only — the page's script-driven body did not render for us. Cited for one thing: that the first of the two amendments of the Electronic Communications Act implementing the DSA was signed by the President at the end of September 2026. Treat the date as the trade press's, not ours.
  9. KontorBund — Age verification and age assurance Where attestation, assurance, verification and age signals are separated, where the DSA's own youth-protection duty and size carve-outs are set out, and where the 6% ceiling is recorded
  10. KontorBund — the EU side of age assurance Anchored pointer on the same explainer: the live DSA layer, the Commission's age-verification Recommendation and the wallet timetable — the context in which Poland's 15-year aim sits

Tell us what we got wrong

The two things worth having are the consolidated act as the Senate left it — we will re-read this page against it — and the published text in the Dziennik Ustaw once the President signs, which will give the act's number and the real vacatio legis. A source we can open beats ten pages of commentary.