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Italy opens anonymous vulnerability reports — 90 days to fix, no safe harbour

Last checked16 October 2026
KeeperOpen — keeper wanted
StatusChannel open since 7 October 2026

The short version

Since 7 October 2026 Italy's ACN takes coordinated vulnerability disclosure reports through CSIRT Italia. Anyone can report a zero day in any digital product or service, public or private — and can ask to stay anonymous. The vendor's patch window is reported as 90 days, extendable for complex cases, and the reporter does not decide when the flaw is published: that is the CSIRT's call together with the vendor. What the channel is not is a safe harbour. Unauthorised access is still an offence under Article 615-ter of the Criminal Code, the ACN cannot authorise testing on anyone else's system, and it may pass identifying data to the authorities if a criminal report emerges. A reporting channel is not a permission.

The channel, and who it is for

Italy's National Cybersecurity Agency opened a national coordinated vulnerability disclosure route on 7 October 2026. It is not aimed at security firms with a legal department. It is open to anyone who finds a flaw they did not create and cannot fix themselves.

Anyone can report — anonymously, if they ask
The report goes through the ACN's channel and is coordinated by CSIRT Italia, the national computer security incident response team. The reporter can request to remain anonymous. The protection the ACN gives covers identifying data such as IP address, email address and telephone number — with the limit set out below.
Zero days only
The channel is for a previously unknown vulnerability. Once a flaw is public — a published advisory, a fix in a changelog, a talk — the report has nothing to coordinate, and this is not the route for it. Anything already known belongs with the vendor's own security contact.
Any target, public or private
CSIRT Italia coordinates reports on any digital product or service, whether the operator is a public body or a private company. There is no register of eligible vendors and no minimum size.
What the ACN cannot give you
The ACN has no power to authorise testing on the systems of a third-party company. Only the owner of the system can grant that authorisation. So the channel answers the question "where do I send this?", not "am I allowed to go and look?".
This is not a bug bounty
A bug bounty is a permission: the company authorises testing in advance within published rules, and usually pays for what it receives. A national CVD channel is a route: it handles the report after discovery, authorises nothing upstream, and pays no reward.
Your own device is a different case
Analysing the firmware of a device you bought, or software installed on your own computer, does not involve entering someone else's system — the exposure is low. It changes when confirming the flaw means reaching into a vendor system protected by credentials or other security measures.

The 90 days, and who owns the publication

The usual researcher habit — 90 days and then publish — is not how this channel works. The clock exists, and it belongs to the other side.

90 days for the patch
The window is reported as 90 days for the vendor to produce a fix. The account does not present it as a hard deadline that the researcher may then enforce: it is the time allowed for the patch.
Complex cases take longer
The 90 days carry an escape clause for highly complex cases, where the window can be extended. Expect that clause to be used on the flaws that matter most — the ones buried in firmware or in a dependency chain.
You do not get to publish on day 91
By using the channel the reporter commits not to share the details with third parties without the CSIRT's authorisation. Disclosure is decided by the CSIRT together with the vendor. The 90 days are the time allowed for the fix, not a deadline at the reporter's disposal.
The practical shape of it
Coordinated disclosure usually means publication once a patch exists, so the users who need to act can act. If you use the channel, plan your own timetable around the CSIRT's, and keep a dated record of when you reported what. That record is the only thing you control.
Read this beside the CRA clock, not as the same thing. The Cyber Resilience Act forces a manufacturer to notify an actively exploited vulnerability in its own product within 24 hours. A national CVD channel is what you use when the product is someone else's. We keep the two apart in the CRA explainer.

What it does not do: no safe harbour

This is the part small operators get wrong. The Italian policy creates a reporting channel. It does not create protection for the steps that came before the report.

Article 615-ter still applies
Unauthorised access to a computer or telematic system remains a criminal offence under Article 615-ter of the Criminal Code. Reporting the flaw into the national channel does not undo the access that found it.
Anonymity has a limit — and it is the important one
The ACN protects identifying data such as IP address, email address and telephone number, and states that it may pass them to the authorities where a criminal report emerges. Anonymity shields you from the curiosity of the company you reported. It does not shield you from an investigation.
The policy cannot change the criminal code
The ACN's policy is an administrative act. It cannot amend the Criminal Code, and it does not create a research exemption. No Italian law currently provides one: Law 90 of 2024 tightened the penalties for computer crimes without adding an exemption for security research. A safe harbour on the Belgian model would take an act of Parliament.
So what has actually changed?
You now have a named national route, a coordinating intermediary between you and the vendor, and a patch clock. That is worth having. It is not immunity, and it is not permission — if the discovery involved access the ordinary rules do not allow, the report does not retrospectively allow it.

Where else this has been answered

Italy is late to a debate the rest of Europe has been having for years, and the contrast that matters is the legal one: whether the researcher is protected, or only the report.

Belgium — the model our source names
The reference the account makes is Belgium, where a safe harbour for researchers exists, and which is named as the model Italy would have to follow by act of Parliament rather than by agency policy. That is the substantive difference: in Belgium the protection is legal; in Italy, on this account, it is procedural.
France, the Netherlands, Germany, Malta
We have seen the same argument made about France's route through ANSSI, Dutch prosecution practice, the German reform discussed in 2024, and the Maltese FreeHour case. We have not read sources for any of them, so this page asserts nothing about them — see below.

If you find something

Short list, in the order that matters. The first question is not where to send the report — it is what you had to do to get it.

1. Ask what access the confirmation step requires
If the answer is "none beyond the copy I legitimately hold", the exposure is low and the report is straightforward. If the answer is "I need to get into their system", the CVD channel does not help you with that — only the system's owner can.
2. Check for a written permission first
A vendor bug-bounty programme or a published vulnerability-disclosure policy with rules is a permission given in advance. That document, not the national channel, is what addresses the access question.
3. Write down what you did, with dates
What you touched, when, and what you did not do — no copying of personal data, no persistence, no lateral movement. A dated record is what turns a contested account of your intent into a documented one.
4. Then use the channel, and expect the CSIRT's timetable
Report the zero day, ask for anonymity if you need it, and accept that the publication decision is not yours. If you cannot live with that, do not use the channel — but then you are on your own with the criminal-law question.

None of this is legal advice

We describe a policy and the criminal provisions it does not touch. Whether a particular piece of research is lawful in Italy depends on facts about that research — what you accessed, how, and what you did with what you found. That question belongs with a lawyer qualified in Italy, not with this page.

What we could not establish

This page rests on one secondary account. The ACN's own site returns nothing but scripts to our reader, so we could not open the policy, the press release or the reporting portal. Everything below is therefore left out of the text above.

The policy document itself
We have not read the ACN's coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, and we have not seen the ACN portal or the report form. We give no portal URL, no mailbox and no field list, because we could not check any of them.
The date and the signature
7 October 2026 is as the account we read dates the channel. We have seen the decision described as signed on 6 October 2026 by the ACN's Director-General and a press release dated 7 October 2026; we could not confirm either.
The legal basis
We have seen the policy described as implementing Article 16 of Legislative Decree 138/2024, Italy's NIS2 transposition, and as adopted in agreement with the Ministry of Justice. We could not read the decree article or any record of that agreement, so we do not state it here.
The first clock
A 7-day deadline from validation of the report for the vendor to offer a workaround is reported. We could not confirm it, and we do not know from which moment the 90 days run — validation of the report or notification to the vendor. The deadline arithmetic on this page is therefore only the headline number.
The reporting mechanics
Which fields the form asks for, what an anonymous report changes about follow-up, whether a PGP key exchange is required, and whether the service is free of charge: all reported, none of it checked. Ask the ACN, not us.
The comparisons
Belgium is the one reference our source makes, and it is the only one we carry. France's ANSSI route, Dutch prosecution practice, the German reform discussed in 2024 and the Maltese FreeHour case are all part of the same debate — we have seen them summarised, we have not read sources for them, and we will not state their content as fact.
The penalty detail
Figures for the aggravated forms of unauthorised access — including the different treatment of copying data, and the ranges for systems in the health, military, public-order or public-interest sectors — we have seen but not verified. Read Article 615-ter and Law 90 of 2024 in the original, or ask an Italian lawyer.

Sources

One source, secondary, named as such. We would rather publish a short page with its provenance showing than a confident one we cannot support.

  1. Pasquale Pillitteri — Is ethical hacking legal in Italy? What the ACN CVD policy changes Secondary, 16 October 2026, by a chartered computer engineer. Source for the channel's start date in the account's own words; anonymous reporting; the zero-day-only scope; public and private targets; the ACN's lack of power to authorise testing; the bug-bounty contrast; the 90-day patch window with extensions for complex cases; the reporter's commitment not to share details without CSIRT authorisation and the CSIRT-and-vendor disclosure decision; the limit on anonymity (identifying data passed to the authorities where a criminal report emerges); Article 615-ter of the Criminal Code; Law 90 of 2024 tightening penalties without a research exemption; the ACN policy being an administrative act; and the Belgian safe-harbour model requiring an act of Parliament. We read the article's summary and its question-and-answer block; the body of the article was not readable to us.
  2. ACN — CSIRT Italia The agency page for the national CSIRT, and the official end of this file. We could not read its content — the page returns scripts only to our reader. Linked so you can go to the source instead of to us.

Tell us what we got wrong

If you have the ACN policy, the press release, or the decree article this policy rests on, send it. A document we can open beats ten summaries, and we will correct this page in public — including the deadlines, which is where the arithmetic still has holes.